Micro and Macro Determinants of trade temporary barriers: the Brazilian case over the last two decades by Marcel Vaillant & Marcelo Olarreaga
 
 







Micro and Macro Determinants of trade temporary 
barriers: the Brazilian case over the last two decades 
 
 
















Documento No. 07/11 
Mayo 2011 
 
ISSN 0797-7484 Micro and Macro Determinants of trade temporary barriers: the 
Brazilian case over the last two decades 
∗ 
Marcelo Olarreaga
∗∗ and Marcel Vaillant
∗∗∗ 
 
Abstract: When the process of trade liberalisation started in Brazil in the late 1980s, a 
regime of temporary trade protection was put in place. This paper describes the use of TTB 
by Brazilian’s authority over the last two decades. We found them to be highly 
concentrated in a few sectors and to heavily rely on antidumping measures, rather than 
countervailing or safeguards measures. We also develop a simple empirical model to 
explain the micro and macroeconomic determinants of TTBs in Brazil. After controlling 
for the political strength of each HS six-digit sector in Brazil, as well as the time invariant 
characteristic of each trading partner and the level of domestic economic activity using 
fixed effects, we found that low import prices are not an important determinant of TTB in 
Brazil even though more than ninety percent of TTB that were put in place over the last 
two decades were antidumping cases. TTBs are more likely to be observed when imports 
are large. But, perhaps more interestingly, in sectors with low MFN tariffs and where MFN 
tariffs are falling, which suggest that MFN tariffs and TTBs are substitutes. Finally, 
changes in the bilateral exchange rate are important determinants of TTBs, with 
appreciations of the domestic currency making the imposition of restrictive TTBs more 
likely. 
 
Resumen: Asociado al inicio del proceso de liberalización comercial en Brasil sobre fines 
de los ochenta, un régimen de protección comercial temporaria fue instalado. Este artículo 
describe el uso de TTB por las autoridades de gobierno brasileras en las dos últimas 
décadas. Los resultados muestran que estas medidas están muy concentradas en unos pocos 
sectores y además que se basan fundamentalmente en medidas anti dumping, antes que en 
aranceles compensatorios de subsidios o en salvaguardas comerciales. Además, se 
desarrolla un modelo empírico sencillo que permite explicar los determinantes micro y 
macroeconómicos de las TTB en Brasil. Luego de controlar por la fortaleza política de 
cada sector (a seis dígitos del Sistema Armonizado), como de características que son 
invariantes en el tiempo, del nivel de actividad doméstica usando efectos fijos, se verifica 
que precios de importación reducidos no es un determinante importante de las TTB en 
Brasil. A pesar de ello más del 90% de las TTB aplicadas en las dos últimas décadas son 
medidas anti dumping. Las TTB son más probables de observar cuando las importaciones 
son grandes. Más interesante aún es que se asocian con sectores con aranceles NMF bajos 
o que se han  reducido, lo que sugiere un rol sustituto de la TTB por los aranceles. Por 
último, los cambios en el tipo de cambio real bilateral son un determinante de las TTB, la 
apreciación de la moneda local hace más probable la aplicación de TTBs. 
 
JEL: F10, F11 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
Temporary trade barriers (TTBs) such as antidumping (AD), countervailing duties (CVDs), 
and safeguards (SGs) affect a large and growing share of emerging economy imports. 
Bown (2010a) finds that in countries such as Argentina, Brazil, China, India, and Turkey, 
1.5% to 4.5% of their (non‐oil) annual imports are affected by TTBs.
1 Perhaps surprisingly, 
the increase in the use of TTBs occurred while most of these emerging countries were 
engaging in a process of broad trade reforms. Brazil is an interesting illustration. At the 
end of the 1980s, Brazil had a simple average tariff of 45%, but there were no TTBs. By 
2010, the simple average tariff had fallen to 14%, but more than 100 products at the 6-digit 
Harmonised System (HS-06) level were affected by some form of TTB with a simple ad 
valorem average of 60%.
2  
The objective of this paper is twofold. First, we provide a description of the 
evolution in the use of TTBs in Brazil: what types of TTBs are more frequently used: 
antidumping duties, safeguards, or counter-vailing measures? And which are the sectors on 
which TTBs are more likely to be imposed, or partners that are more likely to be affected 
by Brazil’s TTBs. Second, we explore the role played by microeconomic and 
macroeconomic determinants of TTBs. Indeed some TTBs, such as antidumping and 
counter-vailing duties, tend to be conceived to address microeconomic problems, whereas 
safeguard measures address larger macroeconomic problems. Moreover, in countries 
where macroeconomic imbalances are frequent, and in the presence of broad trade reforms, 
TTBs can be used to address microeconomic problems created by macroeconomic shocks.  
Brazil is a country with a significant degree of macroeconomic volatility over 
1990-2009. Figure 1 illustrates the evolution over the period 1995-2009 of Brazil’s imports 
to GDP ratio, GNP per capita, real exchange rate (RER), and the number of new TTB 
measures imposed each year. The values of the four variables are set to 100 in 1995. 
Interestingly, the number of TTBs imposed each year seems to follow the ups and downs 
of Brazil’s economic activity and the real exchange rate. However, contrary to what would 
be expected, the correlation between the number of TTBs imposed each year and GNP per 
                                                 
1 In more developed economies (eg the US and the EU), the share of imports affected by TTBs has been 
declining over the last decade. While 3.5% to 5% of their imports were affected by TTBs during the 
1997‐2005 period, this has fallen to 1.5‐3% of their annual imports during the 2006‐9 period (Bown, 2010a). 
2 Note that the average TTB duty cannot be readily compared to the MFN tariff which is imposed (in 
principle) on all import sources, whereas the most common TTB (eg antidumping) is often only imposed on a 
few exporters from a few exporting countries.    2
capita is positive, suggesting that more TTBs are imposed when Brazil’s economy is 
booming. This is somewhat counterintuitive and contradicts some of the early literature on 
macroeconomic determinants of TTBs, which tended to suggest that TTBs were more 
likely to be used in the presence of domestic macroeconomic weakness (see Takacs, 
1981).
3  
(Include figure 1) 
As also illustrated in Figure 8.1, the real exchange rate shows a negative correlation 
with the number of new TTB measures. There exists a small literature that focused on 
exchange rate as determinants of TTB, but there is no consensus in terms of the impact that 
exchange rate change have on TTB.
4 As explained by Knetter and Prusa (2003) an appreciation 
of the domestic currency makes it less likely to be able to find sales below the price at which 
partners sell to other markets, but it makes it much easier to find injury on domestic firms.  
Whether the first or the second effect are more important in Brazil is an open question. In our 
econometric exercise we will move beyond earlier studies such as Feinberg (1989) or Knetter 
and Prusa (2003) by taking into account not only changes in bilateral exchange rates, but also 
exploring the variation across products (Harmonised System six-digit tariff lines). 
Results reported in Section 8.3 below suggest that Brazil’s TTBs affect a relatively 
small share of its imports (around 5%), but within sensitive sectors, 18% of imports are 
affected by some form of a TTB, and this figure reached 100% of imports in the footwear 
sector in 2009. Brazil’s main TTB instrument is antidumping, which is responsible for 
94% (see Table 8.2) of the total value of imports affected by some form of Brazilian TTB. 
The main targets of Brazil’s TTBs are high income and upper middle income countries. 
However, the share targeted towards imports from China and lower middle income 
countries has been growing over the 2000s. Sectors affected by TTB investigations 
consistently have higher MFN tariffs than sectors where there have been no TTB 
investigations. Furthermore, sectors where the investigations end up with imposed 
measures have even higher MFN tariffs. This may suggest that MFN tariffs and TTBs are 
complements, but it can also simply signal that these are sectors that are politically strong. 
                                                 
3 See also Feigenbaum, Ortiz, and Willett (1985), Feigenbaum and Willett (1985), Salvatore (1987), 
Coughlin et al. (1989) and Leidy (1997).  
4 A very interesting paper on exchange rates and TTB is Leidy and Hoekman (1990), but they do not focus 
on the determinants of TTBs, but rather their impact on trade in the presence of exchange rate risk. They  
consider an exporting firm facing random exchange rate shocks which needs to decide how much to export to 
an importing country which can impose antidumping duties as a reaction to an important exchange rate 
shock.  They found that the mere presence of an antidumping mechanism reduces exports.    3
Finally, even though there is a significant amount of ‘water’ in Brazil’s MFN tariff 
structure, the levels of protection reached through TTBs are twice as large as what the 
water in the existing tariff structure would allow.  
Interestingly, any acceleration of Brazilian TTBs during the international financial 
crisis of 2008-9 appears unrelated to the performance of Brazilian real economy. Even 
though GDP per capita growth slowed during the crisis, Brazil continued to grow quite 
significantly. An important force behind the increase in Brazil’s TTB activity is likely in 
the appreciation of the real with respect to the currency of Brazil’s trading partners. Indeed, 
Brazil experienced a significant strengthening of its currency that has reduced the 
international competitiveness of its firms. There were numerous calls for trade policy to 
limit the rapid increase in imports, and one of the mechanisms employed were TTBs, in 
particular AD procedures.
5  
Thus, the response of Brazil’s policy makers to a strong and wide increase in 
protectionist demands caused by the strong appreciation of the real has been an increase in 
the use of TTBs. But the import coverage of these TTBs remains limited, and arguably, 
within Brazil’s international obligations within Mercosur, the WTO and other trade 
agreements. Seen through this light the rapid increase in the use of TTBs may be a very 
moderate response to a very large increase in protectionist demand in recent years. 
 The results of the econometric exercise generally confirm some of the descriptive 
results described above. We found that indeed sectors with higher MFN tariffs are sectors 
where TTBs are more likely to be present. However, once we control for the political 
strength of producers using HS six-digit fixed effects, MFN tariffs become negatively 
correlated with the presence of TTBs. Moreover, changes in MFN tariffs are also 
negatively correlated with the presence of TTB. This suggests that controlling for the 
domestic political strength of the sector, as MFN tariffs declines the more likely it becomes 
to observe a TTB, which is consistent with findings of Bown and Tovar (2011) for India.  
Interestingly, after controlling for product, year and partner country fixed effects, 
there is little evidence that low prices by export partners or large changes in imports are 
                                                 
5  By early 2011, protectionist pressure had strengthened with demands to generalise the use of import 
licenses and some arguing for the re-establishment of a mechanism of import controls. These recent calls led 
Jose Tavares, a well known Brazilian economist from CINDES (Rio de Janeiro) with academic and 
governmental background, to write in the press that it is not feasible to re-establish imports control in Brazil, 
partly because of its international commitments (Tavares, 2011). See Barral and Brogini (2010) for similar 
arguments.   4
more likely to lead to TTBs. On the other hand the bilateral real exchange rate has always a 
strong negative and statistically significant impact on the probability of observing a TTB. 
This means that when the domestic currency appreciates with respect to the currency of 
one trading partner, it becomes more likely to observe that a TTB is imposed on that 
particular trading partner.  
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. The first two sections are 
descriptive. Section 8.2 focuses on Brazil’s trade liberalisation efforts in the 1990s. Section 
8.3 describes the evolution in the use of temporary trade barriers during this period. 
Section 8.4 develops an empirical model to explore the macro and micro determinants of 
TTBs in Brazil and presents some econometric results. Section 8.5 concludes. 
 
2. TRADE LIBERALISATION IN BRAZIL 
 
Like many other Latin American countries, Brazil adopted import substitution policies in 
the 1960s and had a very restrictive trade policy regime for the following two decades. At 
the end of the 1980s, there was a gradual move towards a more open trade policy regime 
that was triggered by two complementary factors: the presence of very large economic 
distortions that required reform, and more importantly, exogenous changes in the political 
economy preferences of policymakers away from a view that development could flourish 
under import substitution policies.  
This change in policy preferences led to two reforms during the Sarney 
Administration; these reforms were later deepened during the 1990s by the Collor de Mello 
government through four scheduled stages (1991-3).
6 The Sarney Administration’s reforms 
focused mainly on liberalizing imports of intermediate goods. The Collor de Mello 
Administration then pursued an important media campaign in favour of trade openness that 
led to an erosion of public support for protectionist policies. It also extended the Sarney 
                                                 
6 The Sarney Administration implemented two reforms: in June 1988 and September 1989. The first was a 
generalised reduction of import tariffs, and the second was concentrated on intermediate and capital goods. 
Both reforms reduced redundant protection. The average tariff fell by 26 percentage points between 1987 and 
1989, but the structure of protection did not change significantly, the correlation between the tariff structure 
across sectors was 0.72 between 1987 and 1989. The government of Collor de Mello staged four tariff 
reductions: February 1992, January 1992, 1993, and 1994. After the first reduction superfluous protection 
persisted, this was almost completely absent after the second adjustment, though with the exception of some 
consumption goods. The projected targets were fully achieved. Between 1990 and 1993, the average tariff 
declined from 27.2% to 12.5%, the standard deviation fell from 14.9% to 6.7%, the minimum value from 
3.3% to 0%, and the maximum from 78.7% to 34% (Kume et al, 2003).   5
Administration reforms to include capital goods. The economic rationale for these reforms 
was based on the idea that Brazil was lagging behind the technological frontier due to the 
high rate of protection in intermediate and capital goods. 
Brazil’s unilateral tariff reforms led to drastic reductions in protection levels, as 
illustrated in Table 1. The nominal average MFN tariff was reduced from 32% in 1990 to 
11% in 1994, and the effective rate of protection also fell from 45% to 14% during the 
period (Kume et al, 2003).  
Nevertheless, Brazil’s large tariff reductions did not lead to a substantial increase in 
imports. Imports did not respond to these tariff cuts because most of the very high levels of 
protection by the end of the 1980s had already been eroded through the existence of a 
multitude of special regimes that allowed producers to import at much lower levels of 
protection. The ‘apparent’ drastic liberalisation was therefore not one that had a real impact 
on the costs faced by importers. The unilateral reduction of these ‘most favoured nation’ 
(MFN) tariffs was combined with a simplification or elimination of many special trade 
regimes. The redundancy of the MFN tariffs also explains why the private sector did not 
oppose the trade reforms. The reforms simply led to a consolidation of trade legislation 
towards a similar level of protection within a much simpler regime. Thus, what seems to be 
a very large reduction in protection levels (66% reduction in nominal tariffs, 69% 
reduction in effective rates) during 1990-4 was in fact less dramatic due to the large 
number of special regimes in existence prior to the reforms. 
With the implementation of the Real Plan during the Itamar Franco Administration, 
Brazil’s policy of trade openness was deepened, though it later experienced a setback.
7 
During this period there was both a misalignment of relative prices and a resurgence of 
domestic demand that led to a large increase in imports. By 1994, Mexico’s peso crisis had 
triggered a reduction in foreign financing, and in 1995 trade policy was used to help this 
adjustment, leading to a reversal of the movement towards lower tariffs.
8 However, this 
reversal was not large enough to counteract the earlier tariff reductions so that average 
tariffs at the end of the 1990s were much lower than in the late 1980s. Figure 2 indicates 
that there was not much change in average tariff protection after 1993; ie the trend is a 
                                                 
7 In July 1994, during the Itamar Franco Administration and under the framework of the stabilisation plan 
known as Plan Real, all tariffs above 20% were reduced to this level. 
8 In 1995, Brazil increased tariffs for some sectors: cars, consumption goods, etc. In 1996, non-automatic 
import licenses were reactivated, and there was limitation for the long-run financing of imports.   6
slow but relatively permanent reduction in the average MFN tariff. The exception is the 
small increase in average MFN tariffs observed during the crisis period of 2008-9. 
 
(Include figure 2) 
 
2.1 MERCOSUR and the South-South reciprocal liberalisation strategy 
 
From the late 1990s, Brazil’s trade reforms were undertaken through a series of 
discriminatory ‘South-South’ trade agreements. The most important objective of these 
agreements was to facilitate the access to foreign markets for Brazilian producers, but 
contrary to the reforms of the early 1990s, they were less likely to increase the competitive 
pressure on import-competing and inefficient Brazilian producers. Of all the preferential 
trade agreements (PTAs) that Brazil signed, MERCOSUR, which was signed in 1991, is by 
far the most important politically and economically. This bloc stands out as an ambitious 
agreement by four developing countries (Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay) 
aiming towards deep economic integration. 
The integration agreement was formulated around two major time lines: the Trade 
Liberalisation Program (TLP) and the Regime of Adaptation to MERCOSUR (RAM). 
These two instruments governed the process of trade integration and formed the linchpin of 
the agreement. The TLP dates back to the initial treaty of 1991 and was the basis for 
creating a ‘free trade area’ (FTA). Intra-regional tariffs were gradually eliminated using a 
linear and automatic reduction scheme. This liberalisation scheme was announced in 
advance by the member countries’ governments and then carried out twice a year on a 
regular basis, as envisaged at the outset. 
The second instrument, the RAM, emerged from the Ouro Preto summit of 
December 1994. It was established to finalise the FTA as the TLP was reaching 
completion. However, this new instrument broadened the terms of liberalisation, slowed 
down the construction process of the ‘free trade zone’, and defined a new list of products 
excluded from intra-regional free trade. After the schedule laid down for these RAM lists 
had been fulfilled, the integration agreement could be described as a universal, non-tariff, 
‘free trade zone’ with some harmonisation of external trade policies vis-à-vis third parties. 
  Despite Brazil’s broad regional trade agenda, just a few PTAs are actually in force 
(see Table A1). Most of these agreements were signed by the four MERCOSUR members.   7
Since only the agreements with Chile and Bolivia are to be harmonised with the other three 
MERCOSUR members, this presents a challenge to a common external trade policy. With 
the Andean countries, each MERCOSUR member follows its own bilateral framework. 
Most of Brazil’s trade agreements have the objective of reaching free trade area status 
within ten years; the exceptions are the agreements with Mexico and Cuba. As a result, the 
existing degree of trade liberalisation varies across agreements. MERCOSUR is the oldest 
agreement and the one with the highest preference given and obtained by Brazil. Another 
interesting characteristic of MERCOSUR is that the four members share a common 
external tariff (CET), and therefore the level of preference is partly determined jointly by 
the four members as they have to agree on the CET.
9 
Evidence from the 2000s is that the trade policy preferences of both the private 
sector and the government in Brasilia are moving towards a more open trade regime once 
again. For example, the position adopted by the Brazilian government in the non-
agricultural market access (NAMA) negotiations held in Geneva within the Doha Round is 
aligned with a Chairman Stephenson document and has a clear pro-trade orientation.
10 
Traditionally, Brazil has maintained a protectionist position in favour of its own industry in 
its trade agreements, partly owing to its strong import substitution policies of the 1960s 
and 1970s. Beginning in 2008, Brazil has adopted a different strategy in the most important 
forum for international trade negotiations.
11  
 
3. TEMPORARY TRADE BARRIERS IN BRAZIL 
 
When Brazil began its process of trade liberalisation at the end of the 1980s, it 
simultaneously introduced a domestic law for the use of TTBs. As the country engaged in a 
                                                 
9 Note that there are limits to this type of argument for MERCOSUR as the CET is not always ‘common’, 
given its numerous exceptions. There are sector exceptions (investment goods, informatics and 
telecommunications, automotive sector, and sensitive goods), and national exceptions lists. Also, countries’ 
trade regimes and trade preferences have not been fully harmonised. The CET is the same as the collected 
tariffs (tariff revenues over imports) in a third of MERCOSUR imports from third parties. However, two-
thirds of these imports are subject to a zero CET. 
10 The key element in NAMA is the well known Swiss formula of tariff reductions. This trade liberalisation 
schedule has very important properties in the way it affects the tariff structure. It reduces tariff escalation, 
eliminates tariff peaks, and has a consequent reduction in tariff dispersion. 
11 Brazil announced another important change in early 2011 by initiating bilateral negotiations with Mexico 
with the objective of signing an FTA.   8
deep process of trade liberalisation, Brazil put in place a buffer mechanism to subsequently 
manage strong economic and political reactions to these policy changes.
12 
As expected, Brazil’s trade liberalisation was accompanied by an increase in the 
use of TTBs. We begin with a discussion of TTB use by focusing on Brazil’s sensitive 
industries and targeted markets. We then distinguish between different types of TTBs, 
starting with antidumping, which is by far the most frequently used TTB in Brazil. We 
then turn to countervailing duties and safeguard measures.  
 
3.1 Sensitive industries and target markets 
 
Some sectors and some origins of Brazil’s imports are more likely to be affected by 
Brazil’s use of TTBs. In this section we use different indicators to measure how likely TTB 
measures are to be imposed on certain sectors and countries. The formal definitions of the 
indicators are described in Methodological Appendix.  
(Include table 2) 
Temporary trade barriers are concentrated in 12 industries: footwear, plastics, 
rubber, food, other manufactures, chemicals, textiles, agriculture, steel, glass, metal 
products, and paper.
13 In these sectors, an average of 18% of imports were covered by at 
least one investigation. The equivalent figure for overall imports is around 6% (see Table 2 
and Figure 3). The evolution of this magnitude for sensitive sectors is increasing during the 
first episode of unilateral trade liberalisation (1989-1993). The trend begins to then decline 
until 2003 when it slowly and permanently increases until the end of the period.  
(Include figure 3) 
Table 2 reports that only 6% of Brazil’s imports are affected by some form of TTB. 
However, for these most sensitive sectors—ie defined as a sector with an above average 
share of imports affected by TTBs—18% of sectoral imports are affected by some form of 
TTB. These sensitive sectors are also listed in Table 2. While sensitive sectors represent 
31% of Brazil’s imports, they represent 92% of imports affected by some form of TTB. 
                                                 
12 Nelson (2006) points out that the academic literature on antidumping recognizes that antidumping law is 
often adopted as part of a strategy of tariff reduction or to resist protectionist pressures. Such policies may 
also serve as insurance for uncertain trade policy negotiators which allow them to take on deeper 
commitments in a trade agreement than they might otherwise undertake without access to such ‘exceptions’ 
(Fischer and Prusa, 2003).  
13 These sectors have a share of imports affected by TTBs greater than the global average for 1989-2009.   9
Thus, these sectors are by far the main drivers of the 6% figure reported at the end of Table 
2. The sectors with more exposure to TTB measures are: footwear, plastics, other 
manufactures, and rubber, where the share of imports affected by some form of TTB 
reaches 100%, 42%, 29%, and 35% respectively (see last column of Table 2). 
The most commonly used TTB in Brazil is antidumping (AD), as 94% of imports 
affected by some form of TTB are subject to AD (see fourth column in Table 2). In six 
sectors—footwear, plastics, food, chemicals, glass, and metal products—this share reaches 
100%. Take for example the case of footwear, in 2009 the amount of imports was $157 
million, all the HS-06 products imported in 2009 had some type of TTB investigations 
during 1989-2009, and each of the TTB investigations took place under AD. 
Among sensitive sectors, the sector where AD seems to affect the smallest share of 
imports is ‘other manufacturing’, indicating that countervailing duties and safeguard 
measures play a more important role in this sector. All together, these sensitive sectors 
represent 92% of Brazil’s imports affected by some form of TTB. 
Trading partners affected by Brazil’s TTBs tend to be high income or upper middle 
income countries, as well as China. Figure 4 shows the value of imports from different 
types of countries affected by a TTB during 1989-2009. Countries are divided into the four 
World Bank categories: high income; upper middle income; lower middle income; and low 
income; we consider China (CHN) separately from the lower middle income group given 
its importance as a source of imports affected by Brazil’s TTBs. The share of high income 
countries and upper middle income countries is slowly decreasing during the period, while 
lower middle income countries, and in particular China, have an increasing share of 
Brazil’s imports that are affected by TTBs. This phenomenon is magnified as we shift 
towards a more restrictive definition of products affected by TTBs from Panel a to Panel c. 
(Include figure 4) 
Products that have been under a TTB investigation tend to be highly protected 
goods. Figure 5 illustrates that the average MFN tariff for products under TTB 
investigations is always greater than the average MFN tariff. Also, among the products 
subject to TTB investigations, those with an imposed measure tend to have a higher MFN 
average tariff than the set of products for which there has been a TTB investigation, but no 
measure imposed. Interestingly, in 2009, for the set of products that have been investigated 
but which have no TTB in place, the increase in MFN tariffs has been stronger than for   10
other products. This suggests that there exists some degree of substitution between trade 
protection obtained through MFN tariffs and trade protection obtained through TTBs. 
(Include figure 5) 
  It is important to distinguish products with TTB investigations and products where 
a TTB measure is in place. There are 212 products (at the 6-digit HS level) where some 
type of TTB investigation has taken place, which we refer to as products with TTB 
investigations.
14 Brazil imposed a TTB in 48% of these products (102) during 1989-2009. 
Figure 6 presents Brazil’s evolution of new products with TTB measures. The last year of 
the series established a record with the largest number of new products affected by a TTB 
measure (19). 
(Include figure 6) 
Figure 7a illustrates the number of products affected by a TTB measure in any 
given year and the average ad valorem duty associated with these TTBs. As a share of total 
imports or the total number of products, TTBs have been relatively stable since the end of 
the 1990s, but there has been a sharp increase in their importance since the beginning of 
the international crisis in 2008-9. Figure 7b shows an increase in the proportion of the 
number of products and the share of total imports affected by TTBs, which is additional 
evidence of acceleration during the international crisis. However, whether in terms of total 
imports or total number of products, TTBs represent only around 1% of the total by 2009. 
(Include figure 7) 
According to Global Trade Alert project (Evenett, 2009), Brazil implemented other 
adjustments in trade protection during the crisis through changes in MFN tariffs—both 
increases and reductions. In fact, MFN tariff changes represent 55% of the total number of 
policy changes that Global Trade Alert reports for Brazil. TTBs are the second most 
frequent type of policy change, representing around one-third of the total number.  
The frequent increases in MFN tariffs to respond to stronger demands for 
protectionism are consistent with Brazil’s obligations in the WTO due to the large amount 
of ‘water’ in its tariff structure.
15 According to estimates by Foletti et al (2011), on 
                                                 
14 In terms of cases, the number is larger because some products appear in several cases.  
15 Tariff water refers to the fact that WTO bound tariffs are above the MFN applied tariffs in Brazil, and 
therefore provide in principle some policy space for tariff increases.    11
average, Brazil could double its MFN tariffs without violating its WTO commitments.
16 
Half of this potential increase is what they call ‘smoke’ in the tariff water, as it would be 
impossible for Brazil to raise tariffs by that amount due to its preferential tariff 
commitments, notably within MERCOSUR, or due to the fact that the WTO tariff binding 
is above the prohibitive level and therefore irrelevant.
17 Nevertheless, their results imply 
that Brazil could increase its average MFN tariff by 50% without violating its WTO 
commitments. 
Table 3 illustrates how similar increases in MFN tariffs are possible for products 
that have been under a TTB investigation, regardless of whether a measure was applied. 
MFN tariffs on these products could almost double on average without violating the 
average WTO commitment. But a doubling of MFN tariffs may not be enough in some 
sensitive sectors, where the ad valorem duty imposed through TTBs reaches on average 
60%, ie four times the MFN level.   
(Include table 3) 
 
3.2 Antidumping, countervailing duties, and safeguards 
 
There are two stages in an antidumping procedure: preliminary and final. In each stage it is 
necessary to establish evidence of dumping and injury to the domestic sector. It is also 
necessary to establish causality from dumping to injury to be able to apply antidumping 
measures. In the preliminary stage, the observed values of the decisions (dumping and 
injury) are the following: accepted (A); bypassed to the final decision (B); or denied (N). 
In the final stage, the observed values for the final decisions are the following: accepted 
(A); interrupted (withdrawn by private sector (W) or terminated by public authorities (T)); 
or denied (N). Table 4 presents results for Brazil (see also Appendix Table A2). The cases 
are divided in three main categories: without AD measures; with AD measures; and in 
process.  
(Include table 4) 
                                                 
16 The fact that MFN tariffs could be doubled before reaching the level of bound tariffs corresponds to what 
is observed on average across all countries in Foletti et al (2011).  
17 The average share of smoke in the tariff water across countries is 28%, so Brazil is among countries with a 
significant share of smoke in their tariff structure.    12
Approximately 58% of Brazil’s 243 cases during 1988-2010 ended up with 
antidumping measures. Almost half of those cases had an antidumping duty imposed in the 
preliminary stage. In terms of products, there were 441 6-digit HS products affected, of 
which 63% ended up with an antidumping measure. More than 60% of those had an 
antidumping duty imposed in the preliminary stage. 
Figure 8 presents the evolution in the number of AD cases initiated over 1988-
2010. The figure distinguishes between cases that resulted in the imposition of an 
antidumping duty and those without antidumping duties, similar to Table 4 (see also 
Appendix Tables A2 and A3). 
(Include figure 8) 
An important observation is that the number of AD measures, whether measured in 
terms of cases or products, tends to spike in the early 1990s, then late 1990s, as well as late 
2000s. This coincides with periods when Brazil’s real exchange rate was undergoing a 
significant appreciation. Thus, this is consistent with the finding of Knetter and Prusa 
(2003) that exchange rate appreciation leads to increases in the number of antidumping 
cases. While the number of cases initiated each year oscillates, the number of antidumping 
cases in force in any given year has been systematically increasing throughout the period, 
except during the late 1990s. The rapid increase in the number of measures in place 
corresponds to the peaks in the number of cases initiated. 
(Include table 5) 
In terms of sector coverage there are clearly some industries that are more likely to 
benefit from antidumping duties than others. Table 5 shows the number of antidumping 
cases initiated by sector, and it disaggregates into those with and without antidumping 
duties, by case and by 6-digit HS product. Chemicals, textiles, and iron and steel represent 
more than 50% of cases initiated (or products covered in those cases) during 1988-2010. 
The footwear and food sectors follow. Agriculture, and sectors intensive in natural 
resources, such as minerals or wood, are less likely to be subject to antidumping. Figure 9 
presents imports affected by AD investigations and applied measures. Chemicals, plastics, 
and textiles covered more than the 60% of imports with imposed measures by 2009. These 
results partly reflect the comparative advantage of Brazil but also the relative political 
strength of these sectors in Brazil’s internal politics. 
(Include figure 9)   13
The average duration of Brazil’s imposed antidumping measures is not necessarily 
correlated with the number of cases brought by a sector. This is partly natural, because a 
sector may bring a large number of cases without much of a legal base to intimidate 
foreign exporters, so as to reduce their share of the domestic market.
18 As shown in Table 
8.6, sectors with the largest average duration of measures are the machinery and electric 
machinery sector, as well as the glass sector. Chemicals and footwear, which were the 
sectors with the largest number of cases, have an average duration that tends to be below 
the mean. 
Figure 10 illustrates the value of imports and the share in the total value of imports 
by trading partner affected by Brazil’s antidumping cases. The United States, the European 
Union, China, and Argentina are the principal targets of Brazil’s antidumping measures. 
They jointly represent around 75% of Brazil’s affected imports. They are followed by 
South Korea, Taiwan, Colombia, and Russia, but these four countries only represent 
around 10% of the value of imports affected by AD duties. 
(Include figure 10) 
Brazil has used countervailing measures much less frequently than antidumping. 
Brazil had 16 countervailing duty cases during the period 1989-2010, and it applied 
measures in only 10 of the 16 cases. These measures generally took the form of ad valorem 
tariffs. For one of these ten cases (‘latex yarn’ from Malaysia), we have no information 
regarding the type of duty applied. Appendix Table A4 summarises the number of cases 
and products affected by countervailing measures with and without duties.  
Safeguard measures are even less commonly used in Brazil. During the period 
1989-2010, Brazil initiated three safeguard investigations: one each in 1996, 2001, and 
2008. In two of these cases, toys and coconuts, Brazil applied measures. For toys, Brazil 
applied the same ad valorem measures from 1997 until 2003 in 15 6-digit HS products. For 
coconuts, which started in 2002 and lasted until 2006, Brazil imposed quantitative 






                                                 
18 See Leidy and Hoekman (1990).    14
4.  EMPIRICAL MODEL AND RESULTS 
 
In order to understand the determinants of TTB in Brazil we will fully exploit the variation 
in the World Bank Temporary Barriers Data Base (Bown, 2010b). In other words, we will 
explain the presence and level of a TTB in a six digit product imported from a particular 
country in a given year. While working at a very disaggregated level, we will use both 
microeconomic and macroeconomic determinants of TTBs. The combination of these two 
is an important contribution of our approach. 
Indeed, a problem with the early literature started by Takacks (1981) that is 
highlighted in Nelson’s (2006) survey of the literature on antidumping is the fact that is 
undertaken at the aggregate level, giving no room for sectoral difference or differences in 
behavior across partner countries. An early literature that starts with Finger (1981) looks at 
the sectoral determinants of TTBs and finds that variables that capture international 
competitiveness, such as import penetration, play an important role in explaining 
differences in filing for protection across sectors. A large empirical literature on the 
sectoral determinants of trade protection exists confirming the importance of international 
competitiveness variables and it is nicely summarised in Gawande and Krishna (2006).  
But the link between sectoral, and macroeconomic determinants on the one hand, 
and TTBs on the other hand, has not been explored until Bown and Tovar (2011) who 
study the determinants of India’s TTBs during the 1990s using a protection for sale model 
a la Grossman and Helpman (1994). Their identification strategy relies on the fact an 
across the board trade liberalisation was imposed on India by an IMF structural adjustment 
program, and therefore could be considered as exogenous to India’s political economy 
forces. On the other hand, political economy forces were leading to the more frequent use 
of TTBs to compensate for the exogenous trade liberalisation. Differences in frequency of 
the use of TTBs across sectors reflected quite well those predicted by a protection for sale 
model, suggesting that they were a natural endogenous response to the exogenously 
imposed trade reforms. 
In this paper we build on Bown and Tovar (2011) by explicitly introducing 
macroeconomic variables to explain TTBs. Our identification strategy will take advantage 
of the fact that a large number of these TTBs do not only have sectoral variation, but also 
vary across partners. For example, antidumping duties are not imposed on all trading 
partners, but only some of them. This variation across trading partners will help us identify   15
the role played by international macroeconomic variables that have partner variation, such 
as the bilateral real exchange rate. This is important in the case of Brazil, because of the 
frequent episodes of strong appreciation and depreciation of its currency. Moreover, 
among Brazil’s main trading partners there are countries such as Argentina, which are also 
frequently exposed to exchange rate shocks. 
 The main microeconomic determinants we will use the price and value of imports 
of a particular HS 6 digit line from a particular country. These two variables are in 
principle a particular important determinant in the case of Brazil because more than 90 
percent of TTB cases in Brazil are related to antidumping, where you need to show 
dumping, and a casual effect from dumping to injury, which depends on the size of 
imports. Other microeconomic determinants include political economy variables, such as 
the concentration of the sector, output, or the extent to which workers are unionised. These 
are likely to be important determinants of TTBs at the sectoral level as shown in the early 
literature started by Finger (1981). We do not have information for these variables at the 
level of disaggregation at which the analysis is carried out, but we will control for their 
role in explaining the variation of TTB using six-digit HS fixed effects, or time varying 
six-digit HS effects in different robustness check specifications. 
Among macroeconomic determinants of TTBs our focus will be in MFN tariffs and 
real bilateral exchange rates. The first will capture the extent to which TTB substitute for 
MFN tariffs (after controlling for the political strength of domestic producers of each six-
digit HS product, which is likely to determine both). The latter captures changes in the 
bilateral competitiveness of Brazil with respect to each of its trading partners. Domestic 
macroeconomic determinants, such as the level of economic activity, unemployment, 
institutional changes are likely to be very important as the early literature started by Takacs 
(1981) has shown. In order to control for all these macroeconomic variables we will use 
year fixed effect.  
The main data source is the World Bank Temporary Barriers Database which is 
described in Bown (2010). It provides data on whether a TTB is in place in a particular HS 
six-digit good imported from a given country, as well as the level of the tariff imposed on 
those imports. In the case of specific tariffs, we obtained the ad-valorem equivalent 
dividing the specific tariff by the unit price obtained using data on the value of imports and 
quantities imported. Data on the value of imports and quantities imported is from United 
Nations’ Comtrade. We used information on the value of imports and quantities imported   16
to compute unit prices for each six digit HS good imported from each trading partner. 
MFN tariffs are from UNCTAD’s TRAINS and they are available at the six digit of the 
HS. They have no partner variation as these are MFN tariffs. Information on bilateral real 
exchange rate is computed using the exchange rate with respect to the US dollar and 
inflation data in each country from the IMF’s International Financial Statistics.  
The empirical model is as follows: 
 
( ) ( ) ( )
() ( ) () ( ) t , p , g t p g t , p t , g t , g
t , g t , p , g t , p , g t , p , g
rer mfn mfn
mfn m uv ttb
ε α α α α α
α α α
+ + + + + + − +
+ + + + =
−
− −
ln 1 ln 1 ln
1 ln ln ln
5 1 4
3 1 2 1 1
 (1) 
where  t p g ttb , , is either a dummy variable indicating the presence of a TTB or the ad-
valorem equivalent of the TTB on good g, imported from partner p at time t;  t , p , g uv is the 
unit value of good g, imported from partner p at time t;  t , p , g m is the value of imports of 
good g, imported from partner p at time t;  t , p mfn is the MFN tariff on good g at time t; 
t , p rer is the real exchange rate with respect to partner’s p currency at time t;  g α is an HS 
six-digit fixed effect;  p α is a partner fixed effect, and  t α is a time fixed effect.  
The year fixed effect controls for any domestic macroeconomic change such as the 
level of economic activity or unemployment in Brazil. The partner fixed effect controls for 
any particular determinant of protection towards that partner that is time-invariant, as for 
example distance, or institutional similarity, or comparative advantage similarities. The 
good fixed effect controls for any time invariant six-digit determinant of protection, such 
as the political strength of producers. As robustness checks we will also try different sets of 
dummies such as partner times goods fixed effects or goods times year fixed effects. When 
we do that some of the variables will have to be dropped as they will be perfectly collinear 
with the sets of more disaggregated fixed effects. 
We expect  0 1 < α as higher unit prices are less likely to lead to finding dumping or 
injury from subsidies;  0 2 > α as larger imports make injury more likely;  0 3 > α as higher 
MFN tariffs capture the political strength of the sector beyond what is already explained by 
the six digit HS fixed effects (i.e., it acts as a proxy for the time variant aspects of the 
political strength of Brazilian producers of a given HS six digit good);  0 4 < α as reductions 
in MFN tariffs are more likely to lead to the use of TTB as in Bown and Tovar (2011).    17
The sign of the last coefficient,  5 α , is ambiguous as discussed in the introduction. 
Feinberg (1989) suggest that it should be positive as depreciations of the Brazilian real 
increase the probability of being able to find dumping by rest of the world exporters. 
Knetter and Prusa (2003) on the other hand suggest that the coefficient should be negative 
because a depreciation of the Brazilian real makes it more difficult to find injury.   
When using the presence of a TTB as the left-hand-side variable in equation (1), 
the coefficients are estimated using a linear probability model, as well as a logit and probit 
model to account for the dichotomous nature of the left-hand-side variable. We also use a 
conditional logit model when we introduce partner times HS six-digit fixed effects to avoid 
the incidental parameter bias when the number of fixed effects is much larger than the 
number of time varying observations in non-linear models. When we use the ad-valorem 
equivalent of the TTB as the left-hand-side variable, the coefficients are estimated using a 
simple ordinary least square estimator.  
The results of the estimation of equation (1) without fixed effects are reported in 
Table 9. The first three columns explain the presence of TTB, whereas the last column 
explains the level of the ad-valorem equivalent of the TTB. All coefficients have the 
expected sign, and are highly statistically significant. Lower prices for products imported 
from the partner are more likely to lead to TTBs being imposed on those imports. A higher 
level of imports makes a TTB more likely. A higher MFN also makes TTB more likely, 
but this is a proxy for the political strength of the sector rather than a sign of 
complementarity between MFN tariffs and TTBs. It simply signals that both MFN tariffs 
and TTBs are jointly determined by producers with a strong political clout. The sign on the 
MFN tariff or its statistical significance is likely to change when we introduce six-digit HS 
fixed effects. A decrease in the MFN tariff is on the other hand very likely to lead to a TTB 
being imposed on these goods as in Bown and Tovar (2011).  
(Include table 7) 
The coefficient on the bilateral real exchange rate has a negative and statistically 
significant coefficient, which is consistent with the results of Knetter and Prusa (2003), and 
with the descriptive evidence provided in section 8.3. Indeed, as Brazil’s real appreciates 
against the currency of its trading partners this makes TTB more likely to occur. 
Table 8.10 reports the same specification as in Table 8.9, but with the set of fixed 
effects described in equation (8.1) to control for missing variables that may be biasing the   18
estimates in Table 8. The number of observations drops when we use the non-linears probit 
and logit estimators because some of the fixed effects can perfectly predict the absence of a 
TTB and therefore all observations corresponding to that fixed effect are dropped from the 
estimation. 
(Include table 8) 
The coefficient on unit values is no longer significant after we control for six-digit 
HS, partner and year fixed effects. Thus low prices do not seem to be an important 
determinant of TTB. All other coefficients keep their sign and statistical significance, 
except for the MFN tariff. It becomes negative and statistically significant. This was 
expected as discussed earlier, as the introduction of six-digit HS fixed effects would 
capture the time invariant determinants of the political strength of domestic producers of 
those goods. The fact that the MFN tariff becomes negative and statistically significant 
suggest that once this is controlled, then sectors with high MFN tariff are less likely to get 
protected through TTB, unless they have experienced an important drop in their MFN 
tariff, as indicated by the negative coefficient on the change in MFN tariffs.  
Finally, the bilateral real exchange rate is once again negative and statistically 
significant at the 1 percent level in all specifications suggesting that an appreciation of the 
exchange rate makes more likely to observe a TTB imposed on imports from that partner. 
The fact that the sign is negative suggests that the mechanisms through which this operates 
is the “injury” mechanism, rather than the “dumping” mechanism. Indeed, when the 
domestic currency appreciates the likelihood of observing a TTB depends on the relative 
size of the “injury” and “dumping” effects. The “injury” effect as put forward by Knetter 
and Prusa (2003) suggests that as the domestic currency appreciates it becomes easier to 
find injury on domestic firms which are losing competitiveness. The “dumping” effect as 
put forward by Feinberg (1989) suggests that as the domestic currency appreciates it 
becomes more difficult to find “dumping” as the price at which foreign firms sell in the 
domestic market is likely to be above the price at which they sell in other markets. The fact 
that the coefficient on unit values is not statistically significant, but the coefficient on 
import values is highly significant and positive suggest that the “injury” effect is likely to 
dominate the “dumping” effect when it comes to the effect of the bilateral real exchange 
rate on TTBs. This is indeed what is found in the results reported in Table 9.   19
We finally perform a final set of estimates where we use country times HS six-digit 
fixed effects. Given that the number of fixed effect is extremely large, which would lead to 
the incidental parameter bias problem of non-linear regression, we do not report probit 
estimates, but rather estimates obtained using a linear regression and a conditional logit 
estimator. The results are reported in Table 8.11. They tend to confirm the earlier results 
reported in Table 8.10 with the exception that when explaining the level of the TTB 
restriction in the last column, the coefficient on imports is now positive and statistically 
significant as expected. Also, the coefficient on unit values is positive and statistically 
significant. The positive coefficient on unit prices after controlling for HS six-digit times 
partner fixed effects could be explained by the fact that products subject to TTBs tend to be 
time invariant, and that TTBs are more likely to be applied on goods for which domestic 
demand is growing and this implies higher prices from these partners.  
 
(Include table 9) 
Results on the macroeconomic variables are again consistent with the results 
previously found where the level of the MFN tariff and the changes in MFN tariff tend to 
be negatively correlated with the presence of a TTB or its level of restrictiveness. 
Similarly, appreciations of the bilateral real exchange rate are again more likely to lead to 
the imposition of a TTB, as well as a more restrictive TTB.   20
4 CONCLUSIONS 
 
As Brazil’s trade liberalisation intensified in the late 1980s and early 1990s, it put in place 
a regime of temporary trade protection. This chapter describes the Brazilian authority’s use 
of TTBs over 1990-2009. Brazil’s TTBs have been highly concentrated in a few sectors 
(chemicals, plastics, and textiles). When the whole set of TTB investigations are 
considered, Brazilian TTBs mainly target high and middle income trading partners. If the 
sample of imports is restricted to products where TTBs are imposed, the likelihood of 
observing a middle and low income country being affected by Brazil’s TTB increases 
considerably, with China becoming more important in the late 2000s. 
The vast majority of Brazil’s TTBs are in antidumping. Over the 1990-2009 period, 
Brazil had only 3 safeguard cases and 16 countervailing cases, compared to 243 AD cases. 
The number of imposed AD measures accelerated in the early 1990s, then again in the late 
1990s, and in the late 2000s. This coincides with periods when Brazil’s real exchange rate 
was significantly appreciating. This is consistent with the finding of Knetter and Prusa 
(2003) that exchange rate appreciations lead to increases in the number of antidumping 
cases when it becomes easier to find evidence of injury.  
We then develop a simple empirical model that looks at the determinants of TTBs 
that Brazil imposes on different trading partners at the six-digit level of the Harmonised 
System (HS) over the 1989-2009 period.  Results suggest that sectors with higher MFN 
tariffs are sectors where TTBs are more likely to be present. But the MFN tariff is mainly a 
proxy for the political strength of an HS six-digit sector. Once we control for this using HS 
six-digit fixed effects, MFN tariffs are negatively correlated with the presence of TTBs. 
This suggests that controlling for the domestic political strength of the sector, sectors with 
low MFN tariffs are more likely to be protected through TTB. This could be explained 
because of constraints on MFN tariffs through the GATT/WTO system or the common 
external tariff of Mercosur. This is also confirmed by the fact that reductions in MFN 
tariffs seem to lead to the imposition of TTB, which is consistent with the findings of 
Bown and Tovar (2011) for India.  
Interestingly, after controlling for product, year and partner fixed effects, there is 
little evidence that low prices by export partners are more likely to lead to TTBs, even 
though most of Brazil’s TTBs take the form of antidumping duties.  The same is true for 
changes in imports from a particular trading partner on a particular good. On the other   21
hand the bilateral real exchange rate has always a strong negative and statistically 
significant impact on the probability of observing a TTB. That is episodes of appreciation 
of the bilateral exchange rate are more likely to lead to TTBs being imposed on those 
trading partners.  
Thus, after controlling for the political strength of domestic sectors (using good-
specific fixed effects), and changes in domestic macroeconomic conditions in Brazil (using 
year fixed effects), there is little to be explained by international microeconomic variables, 
such as prices and quantities imported of each good from each trading partner. But there is 
a strong important role played by international macroeconomic variables such as the 
exchange rate, as well as MFN tariffs or changes in the MFN tariffs. 
This suggests that Brazil is using TTBs, and particularly antidumping measures, 
which account for more than 90 percent of TTB cases in Brazil, to correct for changes in 
international competitiveness or constraints imposed on Brazil by its multilateral or 
regional commitments. This is highly inefficient as it does not target the source of the 
problem. In the case of constraints imposed by multilateral or regional commitments, this 
suggests that Brazil should be using much more safeguard measures than antidumping 
duties. To allow for a more flexible used of safeguard measures when multilateral or 
regional constraints become more binding may be one way of solving the problem. The 
other one is to have antidumping rules that make it more difficult to legally impose 
antidumping duties. In the case of changes in bilateral real exchange rates, there is no 
existing TTB that addresses this type of problems. Indeed, the TTB would need to be 
imposed by trading partner and there is nothing in today’s arsenal of TTB that would allow 
for this. The use of either antidumping measures or safeguard measures would be 
inefficient. A probably more efficient solution would involve the creation of a TTB that is 
linked to the evolution of the bilateral real exchange rate. 
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METHODOLOGICAL APPENDIX 
 












       ( A 1 )  
With 1 i b = if i has a TTB investigation in  [ ] 1989,2009 t∈ and 0 i b =  otherwise;  it vm - 
value of imports of product i (HS-06) in period t; iI Î  such that  0 it vm >  in 
some [ ] 1989,2009 t∈ . 
















       ( A 2 )  
We choose the set of products in sectors where coverage of imports under 
investigations is higher than average coverage. If 
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With 1 i a = if  ihas a AD investigation in  [ ] 1989,2009 t∈ and 0 i a =  otherwise. 














vm b vm =∑      ( A 9 )  
Where:  j =high income; lower income; lower middle income; China and upper middle 
income;  1
i
m b = if  ihas a TTB measure in  [ ] 1989,2009 t∈ and  0
m
i b =  otherwise;. 
1
it
mf b = if  i has a TTB measure in force in the current period,  0
m
it b =  otherwise. 















































      ( A 1 2 )  
Where: with  1
i
wm b = if  ihas a TTB investigation but without a measure in 
[ ] 1989,2009 t∈ and  0
wm
i b =  otherwise. See that 
i
wm m
ii bb b =− . 
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Where: with  1
it
nm b = if  i has a TTB measure in the current period t and not in any 
period tz − ,  0
nm
it b =  otherwise. 
In Figure 7a products with TTB measure and the average level of the measure by 
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Where:  it ttb - is the ttb measure in ad valorem terms.   27
In Figure 7b the shares of the count of products and imports with measures in the 

























        (A18) 
Where:  t I - is the number of products such that import are greater than zero in the current 
year t. 
These last two measures are similar to those computed in the Introduction (Bown, 
this volume); see equations (1) and (2). In the shares of imports we did not correct for the 
effect of the TTB measure on the level of imports as it is done in equation (2).  
In Figure 8 the flow of cases and products with AD initiated investigations and 




















np b =∑         (A22) 
Where: with  1
ct
AD b = if the case c  has initiated an AD investigation in the current period, 
0
AD
ct b =  otherwise; with  1
it
AD b = if the product  i is in an AD investigation initiated in the 
current period,  0
AD
it b =  otherwise; with  1
ct
ADm b = if the case c  has an AD measure in the 
current period,  0
ADm
ct b =  otherwise; with  1
it
ADm b = if the product  i has an AD measure in 
the current period,  0
ADm
it b =  otherwise. 
In Figure 9 the structure of imports by sector with some AD investigations during 



















vm b vm =∑    (A25) 
Where definitions of dummies are similar to equations A7-A.9 but restricted to AD.  
In Figure 10 the structure of imports by country with some AD investigations 















vm b vm =∑     (A28) 
Where definitions of dummies is similar to equations A7-A.9 but restricted to AD.  
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 Figure  1   





















Source: Authors’ calculations from The World Bank’s World Development Indicators, 
2010, and Temporary Trade Barriers Database (Bown, 2010b). 
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Source: Authors’ calculations with data from TRAINS at the 6-digit HS level.   30
Figure 3 














Note: See definition of both variables in Methodological Appendix (equations 8.A1 and 
8.A3).  
Source: Authors’ calculations using the Temporary Trade Barriers Database (Bown, 2010b). 
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Figure 4 
Brazil’s imports affected by TTB investigations in 1989-2009, by type of country  
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Note: See definition of variables in Methodological Appendix (equations 8.A7, 8.A8 and 
8.A9). Source: Authors’ calculations using the Temporary Trade Barriers Database (Bown, 
2010b). 
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Figure 5 
Brazil’s MFN tariffs in products with TTB investigation (with and without measures) 




















Note: See definition of variables in Methodological Appendix (equations 8.A10, 8.A11 and 8.A12). 
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Figure 6 
New HS-06 products with TTB measures, 1989-2009 
 





























Note: See definition of variables in Methodological Appendix (equations 8.A13 and 8.A14). 
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Figure 7 
TTB with measure, ad valorem tariff, products and imports coverage, 1989-2009 
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Note: See definition of variables in Methodological Appendix (equations 8.A15-8.A18). 
Source: Authors’ calculations using the Temporary Trade Barriers Database (Bown, 2010b).   35
Figure 8 
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Note: See definition of variables in Methodological Appendix (equations 8.A19-8.A22). For the last 
two years the cases in process are divided between failed and not failed using the average success of the 
last three years with complete information (2006-8). Source: Authors’ calculations using the Temporary 
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Figure 9 
Evolution of the structure of imports in products affected by Brazil’s AD by industry, 
1989-2009 
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Note: See definition of variables in Methodological Appendix (equation 8.A23-
8.A25). Source: Authors’ calculations using the Temporary Trade Barriers Database 
(Bown, 2010b). 
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Figure 10 
Imports in products affected by Brazil’s AD investigations, by partner, 1989-2009 
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Note: See definition of variables in Methodological Appendix (equation 8.A26-8.A28). 
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Table 1 
 Tariff trade policy in Brazil weighted by value added in free trade  
by sector, 1987-98 (%) 
a. Nominal MFN Tariff 
  1987  88  89  90  91  92  93  94  95  96  97  98 
Simple       
average  57.5 39.6  32.1  30.5 23.6 15.7 13.5 11.2 12.8 13.0 15.6 15.5
Weighted 
average  54.9 37.7  29.4  27.2 20.9 14.1 12.5 10.2 10.8 10.8 13.4 13.4
Standard 
deviation  21.3 14.6  15.8  14.9 12.7 8.2 6.7 5.9 7.4 8.7 7.6 6.6
Maximum 102.7  76.0 75.0 78.7 58.7 39.0 34.0 23.5 41.0 52.4 47.1 38.1
Minimum 15.6  5.6 1.9 3.3 1.7 0.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
 
b. Effective Protection 
   1987  88  89   90   91   92    93   94    95    96    97   98 
Simple 
average  77.1  52.1  46.5  47.7  34.8  20.3  16.7  13.6  17.1  19.9  21.6   20.2
Weighted 
average  67.8  46.8  38.8  37.0  28.6  17.7  15.2  12.3  10.4  14.3  16.6     16.2
Standard 
deviation   53.8  36.6  44.5  60.6  36.5  17.2  13.5  8.4  19.5  37.2  29.6   21.3
Maximum  308.1  201.3  244.3  351.1  198.3  93.5  76.5  27.7  113.8  217.5  177.0   129.2
Minimum  8.3  -2.9  -5.4  -3.4  -4.0  -4.0  -5.0  -4.9  -2.4  -1.8  -2.2    -2.2
Source: Kume et al, 2003. 
Table 2  
2009 Imports of Brazil’s sensitive industries with TTB investigations in 1989-2009 
  




















Footwear 157  157  157  100.0  100.0 
Plastic 1,307  550  550  100.0  42.1 
Other Manufacturing  1,138  324  56  17.2  28.5 
Rubber 1,521  527  511  96.9  34.7 
Food 2,678  168  168  100.0  6.3 
Chemicals 18,600  3,927  3,927  100.0  21.1 
Textiles 2,516  574  472  82.1  22.8 
Agriculture 3,861  144  125  86.4  3.7 
Steel 3,357  251  226  90.3  7.5 
Glass 423  47  47  100.0  11.0 
Metal Products  2,630  308  308  100.0  11.7 
Paper 1,355  81  63  78.2  6.0 
Sensitive Sectors (a)  39,545  7,058  6,610  93.6  17.8 
Total (b)  127,348  7,637  7,189  94.1  6.0 
Share (%)=(a)/(b).100  31.1  92.4  91.9     
Note: See definition of  (1), (2) and (3)  in Methodological Appendix (equations 8.A4, 8.A5 and 8.A6). 
* 
AD/TTB defined as column (3)/(2)*100. 
** TTB/Total defined as column (2)/(1)*100. 
Source: Authors’ calculations using the Temporary Trade Barriers Database (Bown, 2010b). 
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Table 3 
MFN tariffs and WTO bindings for products with TTB investigations, 2006-9 











WTO binding  31.8  31.7  31.6  31.7  31.7 
MFN applied  16.2  15.7  16.8  16.7  16.3 
Without measures 
WTO binding  30.5  30.3  30.3  30.6  30.4 
MFN applied  14.1  14.1  14.4  16.7  14.9 
WTO binding  31.3  31.3  31.1  31.0  31.2 
MFN applied  15.3  15.0  15.7  16.7  15.7 
Source: Authors’ calculations using TRAINS, WTO, and Temporary Trade Barriers Database (Bown, 
2010b). 
Table 4 
Typology of AD cases in Brazil during 1988-2010 
(cases and products at HS-06 level) 
  Cases    Products 
Without AD measures  90  147 
With AD measure  140  273 
•  in preliminary stage  11 56 
•  in final stage  75 98 
•  in two stages  54 119 
AD in process  13  21 
Total 243  441 
Source: Authors’ calculations using Appendix Table 8.A2. 
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Table 5 
Stock of AD initiated cases, without and with AD measures in Brazil by industry 
(ISIC 3), 1988-2010 (cases and products at HS-06 level) 
Sectors Cases  Products  HS-06 
Name  ISIC3  Without AD   With AD    Total Without AD    With AD      Total
Agriculture 111  0  5  5  0  6  6 
Agriculture 111-311/12  0  1  1  0  2  2 
Minerals 200  1  0  1  1  0  1 
Food  311/12 1 7  8  6  30  36 
Textiles 321  7  13  20  13  48  61 
Footwear 324-356  1  1  2  23  23  46 
Wood 331  1  0  1  1  0  1 
Paper 341  4  3  7  4  5  9 
Chemicals 351  45  46  91  61  56  117 
Other Chemicals  352  2  4  6  2  6  8 
Rubber 355  1  6  7  1  6  7 
Plastics 356  2  0  2  2  0  2 
Glass 362  4  1  5  4  1  5 
Glass 362-351  0  1  1  0  2  2 
Glass 362-351-356  5  2  7  15  6  21 
Other non metallic  369  2  4  6  2  6  8 
Iron & steel  371  9  19  28  15  37  52 
Non ferrous metal  372  10  1  11  10  1  11 
Metal products  381  2  11  13  2  11  13 
Metal products  381-371  0  2  2  0  5  5 
Machinery 382  0  2  2  0  3  3 
Electric machinery  383  0  3  3  0  5  5 
Electric machinery  383-351  0  1  1  0  2  2 
Transport 384  0  2  2  0  2  2 
Professional & scientific...  385  2  2  4  2  7  9 
Other manufactured...  390  4  3  7  4  3  7 
Total      103      140        243  168       273  441 
Note: Some sectors appear twice because some cases cover several sectors simultaneously. 
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Table 6 
Average duration of AD measures in Brazil by industry (ISIC 3), 1988-2010 
Sectors Average  duration  (years) 
Name ISIC3  With  AD  Total 
Agriculture 111  4.6  4.6 




Food 311/12  7.6  6.6 
Textiles 321  4.0  2.6 
Footwear 324-356  1.0  0.5 
Wood 331  0.0  0.0 
Paper 341  7.6  3.3 
Chemicals 351  5.2  2.6 
Chemicals 352  5.3  3.5 
Rubber 355  5.8  5.0 
Plastics 356  0.0  0.0 
Glass 362  30.0  6.0 
Glass 362-351  5.3  5.3 
Glass 362-351-356  5.0  1.4 
Other non metallic  369  7.5  5.0 
Iron & steel  371  7.1  4.8 
Non ferrous metal  372  6.0  0.5 
Metal products  381  7.7  6.5 
Metal products  381-371  5.0  5.0 
Machinery 382  7.5  7.5 
Electric machinery  383  7.7  7.7 
Electric machinery  383-351  1.0  1.0 
Transport 384  3.5  3.5 
Professional & scientific equipment  385  2.0  1.0 
Other manufactured products  390  6.0  2.6 
Total   5.9  3.4 
a) No data available.
 
Source: Authors’ calculations using the Temporary Trade Barriers Database (Bown, 2010b). 
 
Table 7 
Explaining TTBs in Brazil 
  Linear Probability 
Model  Logit Probit OLS 











































Fixed  Effects  No No No No 
R-squared  0.19 0.12 0.12 0.03 
#  observations  41439 41439 41439 41439 
Notes: In the first three columns the left-hand side variable takes the value 1 if there is a TTB and is zero 
otherwise. In the fourth column the left-hand-side variable is the ad-valorem equivalent of the TTB. All right-
hand-side variables are in logs. White robust standard errors are given in parenthesis. * stands for statistical   42
significance at the 10 percent level, ** for statistical significance at the 5 percent level and *** for statistical 
significance at the 1 percent level. 
Table 8 
Explaining TTBs in Brazil and controlling for missing variables 
 Linear  Probability 
Model 
Logit Probit OLS 









































Fixed  Effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared  0.36 0.57 0.57 0.17 
#  observations  41439 20723 20723 41439 
Notes: In the first three columns the left-hand side variable takes the value 1 if there is a TTB and is zero 
otherwise. In the fourth column the left-hand-side variable is the ad-valorem equivalent of the TTB. The 
number of observation changes for the logit and probit estimators as some of the fixed effect predict the 
absence of TTB perfectly and are therefore dropped from the regression. All right-hand-side variables are in 
logs. All four regressions have a set of fixed effects that control for time-invariant HS six-digit effects, 
partner fixed effects and year fixed effects. White robust standard errors are given in parenthesis. * stands for 
statistical significance at the 10 percent level, ** for statistical significance at the 5 percent level and *** for 
statistical significance at the 1 percent level. 
 
Table 9 
Explaining TTBs in Brazil and controlling for (more) missing variables 
 Linear  Probability 
Model 
Conditional Logit  OLS 
































Fixed  Effects  Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared 0.45  0.57  0.28 
#  observations  41439 3915 41439 
Notes: In the first two columns the left-hand side variable takes the value 1 if there is a 
TTB and is zero otherwise. In the third column the left-hand-side variable is the ad-
valorem equivalent of the TTB. The number of observation changes for the logit and 
probit estimators as some of the fixed effect predict the absence of TTB perfectly and are 
therefore dropped from the regression. All right-hand-side variables are in logs. All three 
regressions have a set of fixed effects that control for time-invariant HS six-digit effects 
times partner fixed effects. White robust standard errors are given in parenthesis. * stands 
for statistical significance at the 10 percent level, ** for statistical significance at the 5 
percent level and *** for statistical significance at the 1 percent level. 
   43
STATISTICAL APPENDIX 
Table A1 
Brazil’s PTAs in force with third countries, 1991-2008 
Partner  Year Type  of  agreement 
Argentina, Paraguay and 
Uruguay (ACE 
a, 18) 
1991  Plurilateral  FTA (2001) and CU (in 
construction) 
Chile (ACE, 35)  1996  Common with MECOSUR countries  FTA in goods 
Bolivia  1997  Common with MERCOSUR countries  FTA in goods 
México (ACE 53 and 55)  2003  Bilateral  Trade rules and 
automotive sector 
Cuba 2000  Bilateral  Partial  preference 
Peru (ACE, 58)  2005  Common with MERCOSUR but 
different bilateral preference 
FTA in goods (2014) 
Ecuador, Colombia  and 
Venezuela (ACE, 59) 
2005  Common with MERCOSUR but 
different bilateral preference 
FTA in goods (2018) 
a Acuerdo de Complementación Económica (Economic Complementation Agreement). 
Source: Moncarz, Olarreaga, and Vaillant (2010). 
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Table A2 
Typology of AD cases in Brazil for 1988-2010, combinations of decisions at the 
preliminary and final stages of the procedure (cases and products at HS-06) 
   Cases     Products  Calculation of interval 




Without AD  90  147    0.0 
..-.. 1  23    0.0 
AA-.N 1  1    0.0 
BB-.N 1  1    0.0 
BB-AN 19  25    0.0 
BB-NN 49  63    0.0 
BB-TT 10  16  Revoke-Final     0.8 
a) 
BB-WW 8  12    0.0 
NN-NN 1  6    0.0 
        
AD in process of study  13  21    0.0 
MIMI-MIMI 13  21    0.0 
        
AD in preliminary stage  11  56     
AA-NN 8  46  Final-Preliminary  1.5 
AA-TT 2  9  Final-Preliminary  8.5 
AA-WW 1  1  Final-Preliminary  1.0 
        
AD in final stage  75  98     
BB-AA 66  89  Revoke-Final     5.3 
b) 
BB-OTHOTH 2  2  Revoke-Final  5.0 
MIMI-AA 5  5  Revoke-Final  6.2 
NN-AA 2  2  Revoke-Final  1.0 
        
AD in two stages  54  119  Revoke-Preliminary   
AA-AA 54  119  Revoke-Preliminary  6.4 
        
Total 243  441    3.4 
a) There are two cases where the final decisions are T but the revoke year is not immediate. 
b) There is one case where we do not have information about the revoke year and thus we use the average to 
perform calculations. 
Source: Authors’ calculations using the Temporary Trade Barriers Database (Bown, 2010b). 
Notes: For example, an investigation with bypassed preliminary stage and final affirmative dumping but final 
negative injury finding will show up as BB-AN. More specifically, A: accepted; N: denied; B: bypassed; T: 
terminated; W: withdrawn; MI: missing; OTH: other.   45
Table A3 
Brazil’s AD initiations in 1988-2010, with and without AD measures  
 
 Cases  Products  (HS-06) 
  Total  Without AD  With AD  Total  Without AD  With AD 
1988  2 0  2  2  0  2 
1989  2 0  2  2  0  2 
1990  2 0  2  2  0  2 
1991  13 8  5  13  8  5 
1992  8 0  8  9  0  9 
1993  27 16  11  62  16  46 
1994  10 6  4  11  6  5 
1995  5 0  5  5  0  5 
1996  16 10  6  18  12  6 
1997  9 2  7  15  4  11 
1998  20 5  15  46 10  36 
1999  15 4  11  42  9  33 
2000  8 5  3  19 13  6 
2001  17 12  5  20  13  7 
2002  8 5  3  22 17  5 
2003  4 1  3  4  1  3 
2004  8 5  3  8  5  3 
2005  6 6  0  6  6  0 
2006  12 3  9  20  3  17 
2007  13 1  12  23  1  22 
2008  24 1  23  70 23  47 
   2009 
a)  9 1  8  17  4  13 
   2010 
a)  5 1  4  5  1  4 
Stock  243 91  152  441 152  289 
a) In 2009 and 2010, cases (8 and 4) and products (13 and 4) with AD measures are 
estimated due to lack of information. The observed figures for cases (products) are 1 
(1) with AD measure in 2009 and 0 (0) in 2010. 
Source: Authors’ calculations using the Temporary Trade Barriers Database (Bown, 
2010b).   46
Table A4 
Brazil’s Countervailing duties 
Country Products 
                       Dates                  Measure 
Initiation 





years  Type         Level 
Argentina  Disposable 
Diapers  1991   0  .   
Malaysia Latex  Yarn  1991  1991  6  missing  missing 
European 
Union  Milk Products  1992  1992  3  ad valorem  20.7 
USA Wheat  1992      .   
Pakistan Cotton  Yarn  1993    0  .   


























1994 1995  7  ad  valorem  81.4 
Sri Lanka  Coconut Milk 











2001   0  .   
India  Stainless Steel 






2007 2008  3  specific  duty  $165.08/t 
Source: Authors’ calculations using the Temporary Trade Barriers Database (Bown, 2010b). 